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Abstract
This paper discusses a possible resolution of the nonobjectivity-
nonlocality dilemma in quantum mechanics in ’the light of experi-
mental tests of the Bell inequality for two entangled photons and a
Bell-like inequality for a single neutron. My conclusion is that these
experiments show that quantum mechanics is nonobjective: that is,
the values of physical observables cannot be assigned to a system be-
fore measurement. Bell’s assumption of nonlocality has to be rejected
as having no direct experimental confirmation, at least thus far. I also
consider the relationships between nonobjectivity and contextuality.
Specifically, I analyze the impact of the Kochen-Specker theorem on
the problem of contextuality of quantum observables. I argue that,
just as von Neumann’s “no-go” theorem, the Kochen-Specker theorem
is based on assumptions that do not correspond to the real physical
situation. Finally, I present a theory of measurement based on a classi-
cal, purely wave model (pre-quantum classical statistical field theory),
a model that reproduces quantum probabilities. In this model contin-
uous fields are transformed into discrete clicks of detectors. While this
model is classical, it is nonobjective. In this case, nonobjectivity is
the result of the dependence of experimental outcomes on the context
of measurement, in accordance with Bohr’s view.
1
1 Introduction
The common interpretation of J. Bell’s argument is that a violation of his
inequality implies that local realism has to be rejected. Experimental tests
[1] – [3] can be considered as signs1 that local realism contradicts experi-
mental data and therefore has to be rejected. However, the notion of “local
realism” is ambiguous. It should, I argue, be split into two unambiguous
notions, “realism” and “locality,” which were indeed separated by Bell [5].
My analysis of several well-known experiments compels me to conclude that
quantum mechanics is nonobjective, in the sense that the values of physical
observables cannot be assigned to a quantum system before measurement.
Bell’s assumption of nonlocality (in the sense of “action at a distance,” al-
lowing for instantaneous physical connections between spatially separated
events), as a possible alternative, has to be rejected in view of the fact that
there is no experimental evidence to support it, while it is in conflict with
relativity, which is well confirmed experimentally. I also discuss the rela-
tionships between nonobjectivity and contextuality. In particular, I analyze
the impact of the Kochen-Specker theorem on the problem of the contextual
nature of quantum observables. My conclusion is that, similarly to the von
Neumann “no-go” theorem, the Kochen-Specker theorem is based on several
assumptions that do not correspond to the real physical situation considered
in quantum mechanics. Finally, I present a theory of measurements for a
classical wave or field model (pre-quantum classical statistical field theory)
that reproduces quantum probabilities. In this model, continuous fields are
transformed into discrete clicks of detectors. While this model is classical
(as concerns the behavior of quantum objects), it is nonobjective. In this
case nonobjectivity is the result of contextuality the dependence of mea-
surement outcomes on the context of measurement (in accordance with N.
Bohr’s views).
2 A resolution of dilemma: nonlocality or
nonobjectivity?
I begin with defining our main terms:
1Typically, the claim is stronger: it was “experimentally proven”... However, there are
some problems with this type of assertion. See, e.g., [4] and references there.
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(R)Realism: The possibility of assigning to a quantum system the values
of observable quantities before measurement2 and these values are confirmed
by this measurement.
(L) Locality: No action at a distance.
Therefore, anyone who accepts that experiments are strong signs that
local realism has to be rejected has to make the choice between:
(NONL) Realism, but nonlocality (Bell’s position). (NR) No realism
(nonobjectivity) and locality (Bohr’s position). (NONL+NR) Nonlocality +
nonobjectivity.
The last possibility, (NONL+NR), appears to be too complex and is
unlikely to occur in nature. One cannot of course completely exclude the
possibility that nature is sufficiently exotic for this to happen. However, the
(NONL+NR)-interpretation of experimental results can, at the very least,
be excluded by the Occam-razor type of reasoning as a non-parsimonious
option.
In any event, one need not make this assumption in order to resolve the
problem in question in this paper. It is sufficient to consider the alternative
between nonlocality and nonobjectivity, and to choose between them. Thus,
the choice is between the position taken by Bell (or by D. Bohm, at least,
insofar as Bohmian mechanics it concerned) or the position taken by Bohr,
and, following him, W.Heisenberg and W. Pauli. It should be noted that the
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, at least as understood by
the latter three figures, rejects nonlocality. Bohr maintained that the values
of observable quantum quantities are “created” in the process of the interac-
tion between quantum systems and measurement devices. Accordingly, his
main point was the impossibility of realism in the sense of assigning inde-
2 In philosophical terms, this is not the only or the most rigorous definition of realism
or, to begin with, reality or objectivity (objective reality). This is because it is more
philosophically appropriate to assume that in order for something to be real or objective,
or objectively real, it is sufficient for this something to exist independently, and hence,
without any necessary relation with experiment. See the definition of value definiteness
(VD) in the section on the Kochen-Specker theorem below. However, Bell used the term
“measurement realism” in accordance with my definition here. Indeed, if the values of
physical observables existed independently, but did not coincide with the outcomes of
measurements, then Bell’s argument would not imply Bell’s inequality. See [6]–[8] for an
analysis and examples. In philosophic literature (R) is often referred as the principle of
faithful measurement (FM) [9]. See, again, the discussion of the Kochen-Specker theorem
in section 3.1.
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pendently existing, “objective,” properties to quantum objects themselves.
It is typically assumed that the present experimental situation in quan-
tum physics does not provide us with a possibility to make the choice between
the two alternative positions in question; this is indeed correct if one only
considers experiments of the EPR-Bohm type, in which realism and locality
are intermixed. However, an exciting recent experiment in neutron inter-
ferometry supports the thesis that quantum mechanics is contextual [10].
But contextuality implies nonobjectivity!3 In the contextual situation, it is
impossible to assign the values of physical observables before measurement.
Therefore, this experiment can be considered as supporting nonobjectivity.
It is an experiment about the nonobjectivity of the results of measurements
for a single particle.
The following assumption, then, would seem to be logically justified. If
even the case of a single particle already exhibits a lack of objectivity in
quantum physics, then it is reasonable to assume that the situation cannot
be improved by considering a pair of particles. Hence, it is also reasonable to
expect and even assume nonobjectivity in the EPR-Bohm experiment. This
implies that in the alternative (NONL) or (NR), the choice of (NR) is more
justified than the choice of (NONL). A following conclusion may then be
drawn: Recent experiments in foundational aspects of quantum physics can
be considered as supporting Bohr’s view that quantum observables are nonob-
jective: their values cannot be assigned before measurement. The assumption
of nonlocality has to be rejected, because there is no direct experimental ev-
idence of nonlocality, comparable to the test of nonobjectivity performed in
[10], and because in the EPR-Bohm type of experiments it is not necessary
to assume nonlocality, if one assumes nonobjectivity.
Two additional remarks are in order at this point. First of all, because,
the experiments with neutrons have practically 100% efficiency, the experi-
ment of H. Rauch and his team just discussed can be considered as essentially
loophole free. Secondly, Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics and his
position on the situation in question was elaborated through an analysis of
the physical and philosophical consequences of Heisenberg’s uncertainty prin-
ciple. This justification of nonobjectivity of quantum mechanics was later
strongly criticized by H. Margenau [11] and L. Ballentine [12], considered in
3I reiterate that by objectivity or realism I understand “measurement” objectivity or
realism. See note 2 above. Accordingly, contextuality does not imply the violation of the
principle of value definiteness (VD).
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detail in an earlier book by the present author [8]. They rightly pointed out
that Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle could only be rigorously presented
in the form of the Schro¨dinger-Robertson inequality for standard deviations
for two incompatible (operator) observables. However, standard deviations
are statistical quantities and each of them is calculated independently from
another, i.e., we can first perform a series of the position measurements and
find sx and then perform independently the momentum measurements and
find sp. Accordingly, it appears impossible to justify Heisenberg’s original
position that his inequality implies nonobjectivity. Therefore, the test of con-
textuality considered above [10] indeed plays a crucial role in the justification
of Bohr’s position.
2.1 Against nonlocality
The present argument actually follows a widespread earlier view of Bell’s
theorem and even of the EPR experiment. For example, in his biography
of Einstein, A. Pais [13] says flatly that there is no paradox in the EPR
experiment, and that the latter only means that quantum mechanics is not
objective. A. Plotnitsky, in a long note addressing the subject in his recent
book [14], note 8, p. 247, says that nonlocality of QM is a minority view.
Kurt Gottfried’s article, mentioned by Plotnitsky, expressly states that in
relativity we in fact have a test that rules out nonlocality. C. A. Fuchs, on
the other hand, thinks [15] that by now nonlocality of quantum mechanics
is the majority view, while the kind of view advocated in this paper or his
view (which is somewhat different, since he takes a subjectivist view of both
quantum states and of probability itself [16]–[18]) is a minority view now.
I am not certain that this is necessarily true, once one considers the
physics community as a whole (and not only its quantum information part).
However, it is, in my view, not easy, if possible at all, to change the view of
those who believe that nonlocality is a consequence of Bell’s theorem or of
the Kochen-Specker theorem, in part because there are also arguments that
the nonlocality in question cannot be detected experimentally and, hence,
there is no violation of relativity in practical terms.
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3 Contextuality
3.1 Kochen-Specker theorem
In this paper, I am concerned not with the mathematics or physics related to
the Kochen-Specker theorem, but with philosophic considerations surround-
ing it (e.g., [9].) The explicit premise of the hidden variables (HV) inter-
pretation of theories, as understood in literature on quantum foundations, is
one of value definiteness (VD):
(VD) All observables defined for a QM system have definite values at all
times.
According to H. Carsten:
(VD) is motivated by a more basic principle, an apparently innocuous
realism about physical measurement which, initially, seems an indispensable
tenet of natural science. This realism consists in the assumption that what-
ever exists in the physical world is causally independent of our measurements
which serve to give us information about it. Now, since measurements of all
QM observables, typically, yield more or less precise values, there is good
reason to think that such values exist independently of any measurements -
which leads us to assume (VD). Note that we do not need to assume here
that the values are faithfully revealed by measurement, but only that they
exist! [9].
It follows that our assumption of realism (or objectivity), (R), is stronger
than (VD), i.e., (R) implies (VD). By (R), the values of physical observables
not only exist, but they are also faithfully revealed by measurement. (R) is
also known as the principle of faithful measurement (FM) [9].
One can concretize our “innocuous” realism by the second assumption of
non- contextuality:
(NC) If a QM system possesses a property (value of an observable), then
it does so independently of any measurement context, i.e. independently of
how that value is eventually measured.
By the Kochen-Specker theorem (ND) and (NC), under the additional
assumptions of the sum rule and the product rule [9], are incompatible with
quantum mechanics. I restate these rules here. Values of observables conform
to the following constraints:
(a) If A,B,C are all compatible and C = A+B, then v(C) = v(A)+v(B);
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(b) if A,B,C are all compatible and C = AB, then v(C) = v(A)v(B).
3.2 Contextuality
Since the notion of contextuality used in literature on quantum foundations
often depends on the problems one considers and, hence, vary, I would like to
follow the philosophical definition that expresses the general content of this
notion and not its specific applications, (cf. [5], [8]). The negation of (NC)
gives us the following general definition of contextuality:
(C) If a QM system possesses a property (a value of an observable), then
it does so depending on the concrete measurement context, i.e. depending on
how that value is eventually measured.
This definition of contextuality is close to the view of Bohr [19], [20] who
often emphasized that the whole context of measurement has to be taken
into account, although, as I explain below, for Bohr the “system” would be
constituted by a certain indivisible wholeness of the quantum object con-
sidered and the measuring apparatus involved (cf., also [8]). On the other
hand, this definition is more general than Bell’s definition [5] of contextual-
ity, used in works devoted to the contextual analyses of Bell’s inequality and
other “no-go” statements. In this view, that context of measurement of an
observable A is reduced to the presence of other observables compatible with
A. (Bell defined noncontextuality in the following way: “measurement of an
observable must yield the same value independently of what other measure-
ments may be made simultaneously” [5], p. 9.) My opinion (which, again,
coincides with, or at least is close to that of Bohr) is that Bell’s contextuality
has no direct relation to the real contextuality of quantum observables the
contextuality of measurement of a single observable, having no direct relation
to the presence or absence of other observables compatible with A. On the
other hand, it is clear that, as things stand now, only Bell’s contextuality has
relation to real experiments. All known tests of contextuality concern Bell’s
contextuality. It is not clear how to test experimentally the fundamental
contextuality of a single value of a single observable. Developing such a test
would essentially clarify the problem of contextuality in quantum mechanics.
I would like to add that Bell’s view of contextuality was actually more
general than the assumption of the contextuality of joint measurements. In
particular, he wrote:
“A final moral concerns terminology. Why did such serious people take
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so seriously axioms which now seem so arbitrary? I suspect that they were
misled by the pernicious misuse of the word measurement’ in contemporary
theory. This word very strongly suggests the ascertaining of some preexisting
property of some thing, any instrument involved playing a purely passive role.
Quantum experiments are just not like that, as we learned especially from
Bohr. The results have to be regarded as the joint product of system and
apparatus, the complete experimental set-up. But the misuse of the word
measurement’ makes it easy to forget this and then to expect that the results
of measurements should obey some simple logic in which the apparatus is not
mentioned. The resulting difficulties soon show that any such logic is not
ordinary logic. It is my impression that the whole vast subject of Quantum
Logic has arisen in this way from the misuse of a word. I am convinced
that the word measurement’ has now been so abused that the field would be
significantly advanced by banning its use altogether, in favor for example of
the word “experiment”.” [5]
This supports Bohr’s viewpoint of the role of observables in QM. In ad-
dition to the experiments in neutron interferometry mentioned above, which
test contextuality with the aid of Bell’s inequality, one can also mention the
experiments testing the assumption of contextuality in the framework of the
Kochen-Specker theorem and its generalizations [21]. However, contextual-
ity in the Kochen-Specker arguments is mixed with other assumptions, some
of which are clearly nonphysical (i.e., they do not correspond to any actual
physical situation), as are, for example, the sum rule and the product rule
[9]. Therefore such tests cannot be considered as tests of “pure noncontex-
tuality”.
Rules (a) and (b) in the Kochen-Specker theorem are natural, for ex-
ample, for classical phase-space mechanics where observables are given by
functions on the phase-space. However, it is not clear why they should hold
for any prequantum model. In general, the “no-go” arguments seem to be
directed not against all possible “prequantum models” reproducing quantum
predictions, but only against classical statistical mechanics. Considered from
this restricted viewpoint, the conclusions of these arguments could be seen
as valid. The problem is that those who advance such arguments claim more
than the known no-go theorems in fact imply. I cannot describe this situ-
ation better than Bell himself did: “long may Lois De Broglie continue to
inspire those who suspect that what is proved by impossibility proofs is lack
of imagination” [5].
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4 Contextuality and objectivity
The postulates (VD) (ontic realism) and (NC) are logically independent.
Therefore (VD) can survive even in the (C)-world. On the other hand, (R)
(also known as (FM)) and (NC) are logically dependent. Therefore, the sur-
vival of (R) in the (C)-world is questionable. This is a complicated question.
In principle, a possibility that (R) and (C) could coexist is not logically ex-
cluded. The detailed analysis of this problem is presented in [9], where it is
rightly pointed out that, although the coexistence of (R) and (C) cannot be
completely excluded, any attempt to imagine more or less natural realization
of contextuality in an experiment leads to a rejection of (R). Following [9],
we consider several types of (C) related to measurement.
4.1 Causal contextuality
An observable might be causally context-dependent in the sense that it is
causally sensitive to how it is measured. The basic idea here is that the
observed value comes about as the effect of the system-apparatus interaction.
Hence, measuring a system via interaction with an apparatus measuring P
might yield a value v(P ), while measuring the same system via interaction
with an apparatus measuring Q might yield a different value v(Q), although
both observables are represented by the same operator (quantum observable).
The difference in values is explained in terms of the context-dependence of
the observables: The latter are context-dependent because the different ways
of physically realizing them causally influence the system in different ways
and thereby change the observed values. The usage of causal contextuality
is definitely incompatible with (R), but (VD) can still be considered as a
reasonable assumption. Thus, “ontic realism” survives, but “measurement
realism” does not.
4.2 Ontological contextuality
An observable might be ontologically context-dependent in the sense that,
in order for it to be well defined, the specification of the observable that it
comes from is necessary. Any attempt to create an experimental picture of
ontological contextuality would generate a diversity of opinions and pictures
[9]. We are interested in the following picture:
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Any property, rather than being dependent on the presence of another
property, is dependent on the presence of a measuring apparatus. This
amounts to a holistic position: Some properties could only be meaningfully
considered as pertaining to the system, if that system is part of a certain
system-apparatus whole. This viewpoint is strongly reminiscent of that of
Bohr, as developed in his 1935 response to EPR [19].
5 Death of hidden variables and born of sub-
quantum variables
The present author spent 18 years working on quantum foundations, and
the final conclusion that emerged from this long effort is that HV should be
rejected. It was not an easy decision, as can be seen from my earlier (2001)
Va¨xjo¨ interpretation of QM [22], which was an (NC)+(R) interpretation. My
decision to abandon HV was not a consequence of my better understanding
of no-go theorems. (The better I understand them the more problems I
see in their assumptions, especially in matching these assumptions to the
real experimental situation [8].) I am still convinced that the Bell theorem
collapses when confronting the problem of efficiency of detectors or, more
generally, unfair sampling [23], [24] (including the experimentally important
version of unfair sampling based on the usage of the time window [25]). I am
still convinced that the von Neumann and Kochen-Specker theorems do not
have much to do with the real experimental situation, and remain merely
mathematical exercises [8]. However, through the study of Bohr’s works
and his interpretation of quantum observables as representing measurements
related to various contexts, I came to the conclusion that “naive Einsteinian
realism,”(R) has to be rejected, that (NC) has to be rejected, and that QM
is contextual [26]. However, I thought that (VD) could still survive.
Recently, I developed a new purely wave model (prequantum classical sta-
tistical field theory, PCSFT) [27]-[36] which reproduces the main probabilistic
predictions of QM, including correlations of entangled systems. However, the
correspondence between observables in PCSFT and QM was rather tricky.
PCSFT is not a theory of HV for QM in the traditional sense. PCSFT has
its own basic variables and fields’ coordinates, φ = (φj). However, because
the values of standard quantum observables cannot be assigned to such “sub-
quantum variables,” both postulates of the conventional HV-theory, (VD) or
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value definitiveness and (R)/(FM) or measurement realism, are violated. The
measurement theory for PCSFT is contextual, and this contextuality is of the
type considered by Bohr, in accordance with the above discussion of ontolog-
ical contextuality: it only makes sense to speak of quantum observables as
pertaining to the system if that system is part of a certain system-apparatus
whole. The subquantum field-type variable φ plays a crucial role in the cre-
ation of values of quantum observables, as clicks of detectors. However, the
functional representation of quantum observables, φ→ A(φ) is impossible.
The temporal structure of the measurement process plays a fundamental
role (cf. [37]– [39]). In fact, the subquantum variables determine only the
instant of a detector’s click. Thus, for a fixed instant of time, it is impossible
to determine the values of all possible quantum observables, even of any two
of them, and even when they are compatible observables. The measurement
theory of PCSFT matches so well with the Bohr’s view that one might even
imagine that Bohr could have rejected his postulate on completeness of QM
in favor of such a contextual model with subquatum variables.
I now move to a brief exposition of measurement theory of PCSFT [27]–
[36], which I develop in detail in [40]. To reiterate, PCSFT is part of the
classical theory of signals. It treats a special class of random signals (with
covariance operators of a special type) and a special class of observables for
classical signals (given by quadratic forms). The tricky point is the corre-
spondence between PCSFT-variables, classical field variables φ, and quantum
observables. The latter are represented by clicks of detectors. It is crucial
that our description of the measurement process is based on the presence of
two time scales: a) the prequantum time scale the scale of fluctuations of
the classical field which is symbolically represented as a quantum particle,
and this scale is very fine; b) the scale of quantum measurements, and this
scale is very coarse in comparison with the prequantum scale. Relative to
the prequantum time scale, quantum measurement takes a very long time,
in this mathematical model practically, infinitely long. The values of quan-
tum observables are created through such a process, in accordance with the
concept of causal contextuality. By moving from the prequantum time scale
to the scale of quantum measurements we determine instances of clicks, the
frequency of clicks for the values of conventional quantum observables, and
the probabilities of these values.
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6 Random signals
The state space of classical signal theory is the L2-space H = L2(R
3). El-
ements of H are classical fields φ : R3 → Cn. We consider complex valued
fields; for example, for the classical electromagnetic field we use Riemann-
Silberstein representation, φ(x) = E(x) + iB(x).4 A random field (signal) is
a field (signal) depending on a random parameter ω, φ(x, ω). In the measure-
theoretic framework (Kolmogorov, 1933) it is represented as H-valued ran-
dom variable, ω → φ(ω) ∈ H. Its probability distribution is denoted by the
symbol µ on H. Consider the functionals of fields, f : H → C, φ → f(φ).
These are physical observables for classical signals. For example, the energy
of the classical electromagnetic field is geven by the quadratic functional
f(φ) ≡ f(E,B) =
∫
R3
|φ(x)|2dx =
∫
R3
(E2(x) +B2(x))dx.
The average of an observable can be written as the integral over the space of
fields
〈f〉 =
∫
H
f(φ)dµ(φ).
To find 〈f〉, we consider an ensemble (in theory, infinite) of realizations of the
random field and calculate the average of f(φ) with respect to this ensemble.
This measure-theoretic (ensemble) representation is very convenient in the-
oretical considerations [41], [42]. However, in practice we never produce an
ensemble of different realizations of a signal. Instead, we have a single time
dependent realization of a signal, φ(s, x). It is measured at different instances
of time. Finally, we calculate the time average. The latter is given by
f¯ = lim
∆→∞
1
∆
∫ ∆
0
f(φ(s))ds. (1)
In classical signal theory [41], [42] the ensemble and time averages are coupled
by the ergodicity assumption. Under this assumption we obtain that
f¯ = 〈f〉, (2)
4Later we shall move from the general theory of classical random signals to PCSFT and
then to QM. A consideration of the complex representation of classical fields induces the
usage of complex numbers in QM. Thus, in the present approach there is nothing mystical
in the presence of a complex-number structure of QM, in particular, in the fact that one
can derive probabilities from complex amplitudes.
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i.e., ∫
H
f(φ)dµ(φ) = lim
∆→∞
1
∆
∫ ∆
0
f(φ(s))ds ≈
1
∆
∫ ∆
0
f(φ(s))ds, (3)
foe sufficiently large ∆.
From this point on, we shall operate only with observables given by
quadratic functionals of classical signals:
φ→ fA(φ) = 〈Âφ, φ〉, (4)
where Â is a self-adjoint operator. Moreover, to describe a procedure of the
position detection we need only functionals of the form
φ→ |φ(x0)|
2, (5)
where x0 ∈ R
3 is a fixed point that determines the quadratic functional (later
x0 will be considered as the position of a detector).
5
In what follows we consider only random signals with covariance operators
of the type
Dψ = |ψ〉〈ψ|, (6)
where ψ ∈ H is arbitrary vector (i.e., it need not be normalized by 1).6 For
such µ ≡ µψ,
〈fx0〉 =
∫
H
|φ(x0)|
2dµψ(φ) = |ψ(x0)|
2. (7)
And under the assumption of ergodicity, we obtain
|ψ(x0)|
2 = lim
∆→∞
1
∆
∫ ∆
0
|φ(s, x0)|
2ds ≈
1
∆
∫ ∆
0
|φ(s, x0)|
2ds, (8)
for sufficiently large ∆. Consider the functional
π(φ) = ‖φ‖2 =
∫
R3
|φ(x)|2dx. (9)
5 For the moment, my analysis remains within the general framework of theory of
random signals. Later, as I move to my prequantum model, PCSFT, I shall consider
random signals as representing quantum systems. The PCSFT quantities, (4), (5), do not
directly belong to the domain of QM.
6This is just a special class of classical random signals. In PCSFT such signals will
represent quantum systems in pure states.
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In PCSFT, it represents the total energy of a signal.(However, this is not
the conventional quantum observable. It is an internal quantity of PCSFT.
To obtain conventional quantum quantities, we have to perform detections,
which will be considered in the next section.) We find its average. In general,
〈π〉 =
∫
H
π(φ)dµ(φ) = TrDµ. (10)
In particular, for µ = µψ,
〈π〉 =
∫
H
π(φ)dµψ(φ) = ‖ψ‖
2. (11)
By ergodicity
〈π〉 = ‖ψ‖2 = lim
∆→∞
1
∆
∫ ∆
0
‖φ(s)‖2ds ≈
1
∆
∫ ∆
0
ds
∫
R3
dx|φ(s, x)|2, (12)
for sufficiently large ∆.
If, as usual in signal theory, the quantity |φ(s, x)|2 has the physical di-
mension of the energy density, i.e., energy/volume, then by selecting some
unit of time denoted γ we can interpret the quantity
1
γ
∫ ∆
0
|φ(s, x0)|
2dsdV, (13)
as the energy which can be collected in the volume dV during the time
interval ∆ (from the random signal φ(s) ∈ H). In the same way
1
γ
∫ ∆
0
ds
∫
R3
dx|φ(s, x)|2, (14)
is the total energy which can be collected during the time interval ∆. Its time
average can be represented in the form (12).
7 Discrete-counts model for detection of clas-
sical random signals
We consider the following model of a detector’s functioning. Its basic param-
eter is detection threshold energy ǫ ≡ ǫclick. The detector under consideration
clicks after it has collected the energy
Ecollected ≈ ǫ. (15)
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Such a detector is calibrated to work in accordance with (15). Realizations
of the random signal with energies deviating from ǫ are discarded. Detectors
are calibrated for a class of signals and the corresponding ǫ is selected. Let us
select γ, as one second. Consider such a detector located in a small volume
dV around a point x0 ∈ R
3. In average it clicks each ∆ seconds, where ∆ is
determined from the approximative equality
1
γ
∫ ∆
0
|φ(s, x0)|
2dsdV ≈ ǫ, (16)
or
∆
γ
( 1
∆
∫ ∆
0
|φ(s, x0)|
2ds
)
dV ≈ ǫ, (17)
or
∆
γ
|ψ(x0)|
2dV ≈ ǫ. (18)
Thus at the point x0 such a detector clicks (in average) with the frequency
λ(x0) =
γ
∆
≈
|ψ(x0)|
2dV
ǫ
. (19)
This frequency of clicks coincides with the probability of detection at the
point x0. Consider a large interval of time, say T. The number of clicks at x0
during this interval is given by
nT (x0) =
T |ψ(x0)|
2dV
ǫγ
. (20)
The same formula is valid for any point x ∈ R3. Hence, the probability of
detection at x0 is
P (x0) =
nT (x0)∫
nT (x)dx
≈
|ψ(x0)|
2dV∫
|ψ(x)|2dx
= |Ψ(x0)|
2dV, (21)
where the normalized function
Ψ(x) = ψ(x)/‖ψ‖, (22)
i.e., ‖Ψ‖2 = 1.
Here Ψ(x) is a kind of the wave function, a normalized vector of the
L2-space. (Once again, we still only consider classical signal theory.)
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Conclusion. Born’s rule is valid for probabilities of “discretized detec-
tion” of classical random signals under the following assumptions:
(a) ergodicity;
(b) a detector clicks after it “has eaten” approximately a portion of energy
ǫ;
(c) the energy is collected by this detector through time integration of
signal’s energy;
(d) the interval of integration ∆ is long enough from the viewpoint of the
internal time scale of a signal.
The assumption (d) is necessary to match (a). I note that the internal
time scale of a signal, i.e., the scale of its random fluctuations, has to be
distinguished from the time scale of macroscopic measurement (observer’s
time scale). The former is essentially finer than the latter.
The scheme just outlined is a natural scheme of discrete detections which
is based on time integration of signal’s energy by a detector. The calibration
of the detector plays a crucial role. This scheme applied to classical random
signals reproduces Born’s rule for discrete clicks.
How can this detection scheme be applied to QM?
8 Quantum probabilities from measurements
of prequantum random fields
In PCSFT, quantum systems are represented by classical random fields.
Hence, quantum measurements have to be interpreted as measurements of
classical random signals. I shall now explore the measurement scheme of
the previous section. Take a prequantum random field (signal) φ with zero
average and the covariance operator given by (6): Dψ = |ψ〉〈ψ|. Then we
can introduce the wave function Ψ by normalization of ψ, see (22). We now
consider quantum measurements for systems in the pure state Ψ as measure-
ments of the corresponding classical signal φ and we derive the Born’s rule
for QM.
Thus, we arrived at a model of discrete detection of prequantum random
fields (corresponding to quantum systems) which reproduces the basic rule
fo QM, Born’s rule.
We stress that the resulting probability, see (22), derived from PCSFT
does not depend on the threshold ǫ, which is natural, since the formula thus
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derived is nothing other than Born’s rule. However, the frequency of clicks
per time unit, λ(x0), depends inversively on ǫ, see (19).
9 No double clicks
We recall that Bohr elaborated his complementarity principle7 from analysis
of the two slit-experiment. On the one hand, quantum systems exhibit inter-
ference properties which are similar to properties of classical waves. On the
other hand, these systems also exhibit particle properties. Wave properties
(interference) are exhibited if both slits are open and experimenter does not
try to control through which slit particles pass, and when a sufficiently large
number of particles hit the screen, where the interference pattern is regis-
tered. In this experimental context, one can be totally fine with a classical
wave type model. However, if the experimental context is changed and de-
tectors are placed behind the slits, then “wave features of quantum systems
disappear and particle features are exhibited.” What does the latter fact
mean? Why is the usage of the wave picture impossible? Typically, it is
claimed that, since a classical wave is spatially extended, two detectors (be-
hind both slits) can click simultaneously and produce double clicks. However,
as it is commonly claimed, there are no double clicks at all; hence, the wave
model has to be rejected (in the context of the presence of detectors). Bohr
had not found any reasonable explanation of the context dependent features
of quantum systems, and he elaborated the complementarity principle in or-
der to consistently interpret this situation. Of course, the claim that there
are no double clicks at all is meaningless at the experimental level. There are
always double clicks. The question is whether the number of double clicks is
very small (compared with the numbers of single clicks). The corresponding
experiments have been performed [42], [43], which show that the number
of double clicks is relatively small. Such experiments are considered as a
confirmation of Bohr’s complementarity principle.
I would argue that the absence of double clicks might not be fundamen-
tal, but is instead a consequence of the procedure of calibration of detectors.
Consider again a random signal φ. But now we take two threshold type de-
tectors located in neighborhoods Vx0 and Vy0 of the points x0 and y0. Suppose
that both detectors have the same detection threshold ǫ. It is convenient to
7This principle is often called “wave-particle” duality. However, Bohr never used the
latter terminology himself.
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represent ǫ in the form ǫ = C‖ψ(x)‖2, where the vector ψ determines the
covariance operator of the prequantum random signal and C > 0 is a con-
stant. (Here Ψ = ψ/‖ψ‖ is the quantum state corresponding the prequantum
signal.) For the moments of clicks, we have two approximate equalities:
1
γ
∫ ∆C(x0)
0
∫
Vx0
|φ(s, x)|2dxds ≈ C‖ψ(x)‖2, (23)
1
γ
∫ ∆C(y0)
0
∫
Vy0
|φ(s, x)|2dxds ≈ C‖ψ(x)‖2, (24)
A double click corresponds to the (approximate) coincidence of moments of
clicks
∆C(x0, y0) = ∆C(x0) = ∆C(y0). (25)
Hence, by adding the approximate equalities (23), (24) under condition (25)
we obtain
1
γ
∫ ∆C(x0,y0)
0
∫
Vx0∪Vy0
|φ(s, x)|2dxds ≈ 2C‖ψ(x)‖2, (26)
Again by using ergodicity and the assumption that the internal time scale
of signals is essentially finer than the time scale of measurement (“click pro-
duction”) we obtain
∆C(x0, y0)
γ
[ 1
∆C(x0, y0)
∫ ∆C(x0,y0)
0
∫
Vx0∪Vy0
|φ(s, x)|2dxds
]
≈
∆C(x0, y0)
γ
∫
Vx0∪Vy0
|ψ(x)|2dx ≈ 2C‖ψ‖2
or, for normalized “wave function” Ψ(x),
∆C(x0, y0)
γ
[
∫
Vx0
|Ψ(x)|2dx+
∫
Vy0
|Ψ(x)|2dx]
=
∆C(x0, y0)
γ
[P (x ∈ Vx0) + P (x ∈ Vy0 ] ≈ 2C.
Hence, during the period of time T there will be produced the following
number of double clicks
ndouble click =
Tγ
∆C(x0, y0)
≈
T
2C
[P (x ∈ Vx0) + P (x ∈ Vy0)] ≤
T
2C
.
Hence, by increasing the calibration constant C one is able to decrease the
number of double clicks to negligibly small.
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10 Nonobjectivity and contextuality of clas-
sical signal theory and quantum mechan-
ics
Although the probability of double clicks can be made very small, they are
fundamentally irreducible. This is one of the reasons why it is impossible to
use the functional (as opposed to operator) representation of quantum ob-
servables. However, the main reason for this situation is Bohr’s contextuality.
A classical signal has no sharp position in space, i.e., the (VD) postulate is
not valid for classical signals. “Signal’s position” x0 has meaning only in
the context of the position measurement. I note that the scheme of the
position measurement described in this paper can be easily generalized to
other quantum observables, see [39]. In fact, φ(x0) can be written as 〈φ, ex0〉,
where ex0(x) = δ(x − x0). We can proceed in the same way by taking any
basis ej in the space of signals, instead of the basis consisting of d-functions
and corresponding the position measurement.
Finally, I note that, in addition to Bohr’s ontology contextuality, our de-
tection scheme contains another type of contextuality. As we have seen, the
probabilities do not depend on the detection threshold ǫ. Hence, the position
observable of QM, xˆ, is represented by a family of detection schemes indexed
by ǫ. For the same signal, by selecting different ǫ-detectors we obtain dif-
ferent instances of detection and different values of the position observable.
However, probabilities related to different ǫ-contexts for the position mea-
surement are the same. Hence, in operational formalism, such as that of QM
(cf. [44], [45]), all these detection schemes can be encoded by one symbol,
the operator xˆ. The same can be said for any quantum observable.
This paper was written under the support of the grant Mathematical
Modeling of Complex Systems of Linnaeus University.
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